

A Review of the Social, Cultural, Political and Economic Dimensions of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute*

Eduardo Zachary Albrecht** · Betty Chemier***

【 Contents 】

I. Introduction	V. Nationalism in Japan and China
II. Economic Relations	VI. Anti-Japanese Sentiment
III. Bilateral Political Relations	VII. Conclusion
IV. International Political Relations	

I. Introduction

The geopolitical context surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu controversy is very complex. Firstly, because of the location of the islets themselves, situated in the center of the sea separating Japan, China, and Taiwan. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are a group of eight uninhabited islets and rocks within an area of about seven square kilometers in the East China Sea. The largest of the islands has an area of 4.32 km² and the smallest is only 0.45 km². The islands are roughly equidistant to the north east of Taiwan, the southwestern tip of the Japanese Ryukyus, and the east of Mainland China.¹⁾ The islands are therefore important to all three, for, as Koo points out, “in geopolitical terms, from the perspectives of maritime interests and security, the perceived value of island territories not held by the nearby state goes higher the closer they are to the mainland

* This work was supported by the Pukyong National University Research Fund in 2013.

** Eduardo Zachary Albrecht is corresponding author and Assistant Professor at the Division of International and Area Studies of Pukyong National University.

*** Betty Chemier is a graduate student at the Division of International and Area Studies of Pukyong National University.

1) <http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/06/disputed-territory-senkaku-diaoyu-islands-japan-china.html>, June 1, 2013.

of that state”.²⁾

Secondly, the territorial controversy is also conditioned by the finding of potentially huge amounts of oil reserves under the surrounding waters. This makes it a territory of immense strategic and economic value. In 1969 the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) published a report announcing the findings of oil and natural gas fields in the continental shelf near the disputed area. This event instantly made the islands a source of contention between Japan and China, the two largest energy consumers in Asia. Another important aspect to consider is the economic value of the finny resources found within the surrounding Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), due to the abundance of fish in these waters. The oil reserves, however, are more important because they relate to national economic interests.

China recently became the second largest net oil importer in the world behind the United States, and the world’s largest global energy consumer. China’s gas import has also risen in recent years. The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts that China’s oil and natural gas consumption will continue to grow for many years, putting additional pressure on the Chinese government to seek out new supplies to meet this increased domestic demand. Japan is now the third largest net importer of crude oil behind the United States and China, as well as the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), owing to few domestic energy resources of its own. Although projections point towards oil consumption in Japan declining in coming years, Japan must also continue to rely heavily on imports in order to meet consumption needs.³⁾

The total of the reserves are hard to determine, but different studies have estimated that the oil resources in the East China Sea could reach 200 billion barrels.⁴⁾ This amount of oil could provide a high-energy consumption nation, such as China or Japan, with 50 to 80 years of power supply. But who owns this potential treasure trove?

The problem is rooted in the fact that China and Japan apply two different approaches to demarcating sea boundaries in the East China Sea. Both approaches are based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) but with different interpretations to the text. Japan defines its boundary as the UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending westward from its southern Kyushyu and Ryukyu islands. This would include the disputed territory. China, on the other hand, defines its EEZ boundary using the UNCLOS principle of the natural extension of its continental shelf. This would make Japan’s interpretation of its EEZ null.

2) Koo, Min Gyo (2009) “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 210.

3) <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ecs>, August 15, 2013.

4) http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/east_china_sea/east_china_sea.pdf, August 15, 2013.

On July 20, 1996, Japan ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a move that implied that Japan would have control of its contested EEZ. On July 25, a Japanese nationalist group rebuilt a lighthouse on one of the disputed islands in celebration of the ratification. The construction of the lighthouse was approved by the Japanese government and the structure became an official beacon. This led to a period in which tensions over this territorial dispute were at their highest level.⁵⁾

The exploitation of natural resources is a sovereign right of the state in control of the EEZ in question. Defining the respective EEZs would put an end to the dispute. Also, since the EEZ would extend off the coast of any national territory (including islands), defining ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands would put an end to the dispute over the EEZ boundaries as well. In the past Japan has proposed a solution to the issue with a median line drawn equidistant between both countries uncontested EEZs, but China rejected the proposal on the grounds that Japan would be making unwarranted gains by the compromise.

Following the death of David Chan, a pro-China activist from Hong Kong who drowned in an attempt to land on the islands in September 1996, both governments were urged to bring the conflict under control and to restore Sino-Japanese ties. In 1997 Tokyo and Beijing signed a bilateral agreement over fishing rights. This agreement, which took effect in 2000, addressed three key issues; first, it reaffirmed each country's exclusive rights over fishery resources and fishing activities in its own EEZ, it established general principles for reciprocal fishing access in each other's EEZ, and finally the agreements created a cooperative management regime for their shared fishery resources.⁶⁾ The agreement thus helped define these waters as a contested area, or an area where EEZs are as yet undefined.⁷⁾

In 2008, China and Japan agreed on a joint development to explore four gas fields in the East China Sea. They also agreed to simultaneously halt unilateral explorations in any of the contested areas. When the agreement was made public, both sides immediately took measures to assure their populations that the territorial positions regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands would not be affected. Shortly after, in 2009, China began to develop the Tianwaitian/Kashi gas field unilaterally, leading to tensions and the staging of protests in Japan. Japanese authorities threatened to take the case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

5) Wiegand, Krista E. (2009) "China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy", *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 183.

6) Rosenberg, David (2005) "Managing the Resources of the China Seas: China's Bilateral Fisheries Agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam", *Japan Focus*, June 30.

7) Koo, Min Gyo (2009) "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, p. 244.

More recently, in April 2013, Japan and Taiwan signed a fishing agreement. The accord allows Taiwanese fisherman access to Japanese administered waters near the disputed islands⁸⁾. China promptly objected to the deal. Even if at first glance this agreement might have seemed to be of little importance, its diplomatic repercussions on the status of the dispute were extensive. First, it alleviated the frictions between Japan and Taiwan, putting China in a vulnerable position of isolation. Second, it provided Taiwan with a legitimization of its diplomatic status. Taiwan, which does not have formal diplomatic relations with Tokyo, is still recognized by Japan, with which it is an active economic partner. Third, it presented a number of other countries that are involved in territorial disputes with China, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, with the option of cooperation with Japan.

East Asia is, in fact, home to more territorial disputes than anywhere else in the world. China alone is battling for sovereignty in over a dozen different territories. Japan is involved in territorial quarrels with all its direct neighbors. Given the circumstances, an important aspect of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is the significance that it has on these other territorial disputes. With both China and Japan involved in a number of other territorial claims, neither wants a negative precedent to be set that would change the tone for further resolutions of similar disputes. With their international credibility on the line, each actor in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute must keep in mind that the consequences of their actions will be echoed throughout the region.

Deans reminds us that it is the symbolic significance of these islands, in addition to any rights to the natural resources that surround them, that lies at the heart of the dispute.⁹⁾ This notion applies not only to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute but also to most of the territorial disputes in East Asia. If we look at the territorial disputes in which either China or Japan are involved we can find recurring patterns of behavior that confirm Deans' point. The symbolic significance of the territory often overshadows the true strategic or economic value of owning the disputed area.

It therefore becomes of prime importance for the actors involved in a dispute to 'save face'. As their actions will see repercussions on other disputes, the symbolic significance of one dispute becomes tied to the symbolic significance of all disputes. As Pan explains,

the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is not the only maritime territorial dispute that either China or Japan has with their neighboring countries. The possible negative domino effect of the dispute is what China and Japan attempt to avoid. The real importance of the islands lies in

8) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-10/japan-reaches-fishing-agreement-with-taiwan-over-china-objection.html>, April 7, 2013.

9) Deans, Phil (2000) "Contending Nationalisms and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 120.

the dispute's implications for the wider context of the two countries' approaches to maritime and island disputes... For China, the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands has a strong implication for Chinese concern with their sovereignty in the South China Sea. The reason that Beijing cannot soften its attitude toward the Diaoyu Islands is clear. If it softens its posture over the Diaoyu Islands, it might be considered as softening of its position on the Spratly and Paracel islands disputes in the South China Sea. For Japan, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute also implies Japanese attitude toward the territorial disputes with Russia over the "Northern Territories" and with Korea over the Dokdo (Takeshima/Takdo) Island. Any softening on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute might undermine the Japanese claims to both the "Northern Territories" and the Dokdo Island. Since international credibility is taken into account, the two sides involved are adamant and steadfast in their claims to the disputed islands.¹⁰⁾

Tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have been rhythmically escalating and de-escalating over the past several decades. Many factors condition the fate of the dispute, among these are those that are more evident, such as the hydrocarbon resources and diplomatic stakes involved (briefly considered in this introduction), but, there are also a number of other, less obvious, aspects that condition the dispute.

The following sections of this paper will explore these by reviewing the work of the major international authors that have written on the issue. We will look at the economic relations between China and Japan, the role of the US and Taiwan in the dispute, and finally we will review the implications of social and cultural aspects, such as the role nationalism in both countries and anti-Japanese sentiment in China. We will find that the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands territorial dispute is therefore highly influenced by the status of a larger number of other disputes that the claimants are involved in.

II. Economic Relations

The high level of economic interdependence between China and Japan adds a layer of complexity to the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Tensions over the dispute can negatively affect the economic relations between the two countries - protests and unrest create economic backlashes that both parties would rather avoid. Demonstrations and riots in the context of this dispute have often escalated into the boycotting of Japanese products and have resulted in a decrease in Sino-Japanese trade.

10) Pan, Zhongqi (2007) "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective", *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 72, 85.

The wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations sparked by the purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands by the Japanese government in 2012, for example, led to millions in losses for Japanese firms. Online articles published by CNN and the Fair Observer inform that many industries were affected, from tourism (with Chinese tourists cancelling their tours to Japan), to automobile manufacturing (Toyota, Honda and Nissan reported damages in dealership stores and the suspension of production due to sabotages in their factories).¹¹⁾ There is no exact number on the extent of the damages caused by the anti-Japanese protest, but considering that these events followed the destructive earthquake of 2011, it is fair to say that these repercussions for Japan were considerable.

Nevertheless, some academics argue that even though political tensions between the two nations are rising, the nature of their economic relationship has been preserving the status quo.¹²⁾ In fact, if we look at the past few decades, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship has been essentially positive. In 2004, China became Japan's largest trading partner. It remains so today. Japan is China's second largest trading partner, after the United States¹³⁾. Economic interdependence between Japan and China is of colossal importance not only for both countries but also to the economic stability of the region. For the time being, the two powers face strategic and domestic demands to keep cooperating economically. In fact, as Koo mentions, "when forced to choose, both Chinese and Japanese leaders tend to pursue economic gains at the expense of their nationalist credentials".¹⁴⁾

There are, however, some important changes underway in the nature of the economic relationship that should be addressed here. In the 1990s and at the beginning of the millennium China's economy was at a vulnerable stage. Even if it was experiencing high year on year GDP growth, it was presented with many challenges and was highly dependent on foreign aid, including official development assistance (ODA) from Japan.¹⁵⁾

China started receiving aid from Japan after Deng Xiaoping normalized diplomatic relationship between the two countries in 1978. Roy explains that "this aid had at least two important political purposes: it represents de facto reparations that help compensate

11) <http://travel.cnn.com/shanghai/life/chinese-tourists-cancel-trips-japan-amid-island-spat-110241>, September 13, 2012, and <http://www.fairobserver.com/article/economic=costs-china's-anti-japanese-sentiment>, October 25, 2012.

12) See Katz, Richard (2013) "Mutual Assured Production", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August issue, and Koo, Min Gyo (2009) "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 205-232.

13) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-24739302>, October 30, 2013.

14) Koo, Min Gyo (2009) "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, p. 209.

15) Roy, Denny (2004) "Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan's Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations", *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 93.

China for the harm done by the Japanese during the Pacific War, and it is an investment in China's stability, forestalling the problems a Chinese breakdown would pose for Japan".¹⁶⁾ As a whole, this aid was given mainly through loans and contributed to the building of infrastructure in China's coastal regions. But Japan's ODA to China came to a crossroads by the mid 2000s. Analyzing the shift in Japan's ODA policy towards China in those years, Masuda explains that

under the severe economic and fiscal circumstances that Japan has been experiencing... together with changes such as China's increasing economic and military power and emerging presence as a competitor, there is an increasing skepticism among the Japanese public of ODA to China from a number of points of view. One such factor leading to an accelerating trend among the public to reconsider the ODA policy to China is Japanese frustration towards Chinese intelligence-gathering ships and naval vessels, which became very active around Japanese territorial waters...¹⁷⁾

Furthermore, the Japanese public has been somewhat concerned that the aid that was given was not properly appreciated. Roy explains that "although the Chinese government has never failed to remind the Chinese public about Japan's misdeeds during World War II on certain anniversaries or in reaction to 'militaristic' Japanese policies, Japan has complained that the Chinese government does not publicize the amount of ODA Tokyo gives to China".¹⁸⁾ Appreciated or not, the fact is that Japanese aid has been rapidly decreasing. In an attempt to regain some of this economic aid, Weigand explains that China has at times resorted to "coercive diplomacy" in order to link the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute to economic issues.

Since China clearly lacked economic leverage, it instead used its military leverage by threatening force near the disputed islands in an attempt to influence Japanese economic policies on other issues. As a Japanese analyst wrote, "by applying pressure this way, Beijing hopes Japan will reconsider its plans to cut economic aid to China, and ease its criticism of China's military buildup and nuclear testing program".¹⁹⁾

16) Ibid.

17) Masuda, Masayuki (2003) "Japan's Changing ODA Policy Towards China", *China Perspectives*, Vol. 47.

18) Roy, Denny (2004) "Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan's Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations", *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 94.

19) Wiegand, Krista E. (2009) "China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy", *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 184, quoting Sasajima, Masahiko (1996) "Storm Over Senkakus: How to Deal with a Hot Nonissue," *The Daily Yomiuri*, October 2, p. 7.

We will learn later on that this sort of “issue linkage” plays an important role in China’s dealings toward Japan. At any rate, it would seem like the priority is to gain strategic wins in the economic relationship, while military and territorial issues (like the island dispute) are simply instrumental to achieving some form of economic gain. In fact,

though there is an immense appeal to territorial nationalism in China, there is also a competing agenda, that of economic performance. With the gradual decline of legitimacy of Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideology in the 1980s and 1990s, the CCP implemented major economic reforms, causing widespread unemployment, corruption, and periodic spells of high inflation. As a result, the CCP turned to gaining legitimacy via both economic performance and territorial nationalism. The outcome has been balancing on a fine line, appealing to nationalism with territorial disputes, but then reassuring other states that the CCP wants to cooperate economically with them. The key factor is that, forced to choose one over the other, Chinese officials have often opted to protect bilateral relations, especially with its economic partner Japan, rather than attempting to mobilize domestic gains or satisfy domestic demands. The frequent suspensions of anti-Japanese protests by the Chinese government illustrate China’s concern not to allow nationalism to affect bilateral relations with Japan.²⁰⁾

The suspensions of anti-Japanese protest to maintain the good health of the economic relationship between the two countries is a maneuver that has been frequently used by the Chinese authorities. Referring to the events of high tensions between China and Japan that led up to the death of a Hong Kong activist in 1996, Strecker-Downs and Saunders explain that the reason for playing down the issue was due in large part to the potential economic costs to China.²¹⁾ The Chinese government was able to restore a fragile Sino-Japanese relationship by toning down the rhetoric in the media and in its own official statements.

At times protests have been called off too late, though, and the consequent impact to Sino-Japanese economic relations was felt in both countries. This was exemplified in 2005 and 2012, when sharp plunges in the Tokyo Stock Exchange were observed in the days following the demonstrations in China.²²⁾ In sum, it would seem as though both sides are willing to incur temporary economic costs related to the dispute, while doing what it takes to protect the long term economic relationship.

20) Wiegand, Krista E. (2009) “China’s Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy”, *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 178.

21) Strecker-Downs, Erica and Saunders, Philip (1999) “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 122.

22) <http://www.thestar.com.my/Story.aspx?file=%2F2005%2F42F18%2Flatest%2F20050418150710&sec=Latest>, October 11, 2013.

III. Bilateral Political Relations

After having analyzed the economic stakes involved in the dispute in the preceding sections, this section will look at the bilateral political relationship that both countries have developed in recent history. Understanding the historical context of this relationship is essential to the analysis of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.

Sakuwa reminds us that “the relationship between Japan and China was once frequently described as cold politics, hot economy (seirei keinetsu).”²³⁾ Indeed, issues such as the interpretation of history, textbook content, unforthcoming apologies and territorial sovereignty have often surfaced to chill the air between the two. The last several decades have also shown that, despite these recurring setbacks in the bilateral relationship, both countries proved more than willing to co-operate and reconcile differences when the long term economic relationship was at risk. Rose explains that the relationship has remained quite stable and considerably less volatile than was often predicted.²⁴⁾

Yet a subtle change has been occurring in recent years that calls for closer attention. In the past, whenever tensions rose between the two nations, Tokyo had often made concessions to Beijing to limit the damage, most often to the cost of considerable domestic criticism. However, since the beginning of the 2000s, Japanese administrations have been diminishing their efforts to accommodate Beijing, shifting their focus to accommodating domestic demands instead.

Though Japan is still interested in avoiding a wholesale deterioration of its relation with China, the pressures and complaints from politicians and social groups (often involved with extremist right wing factions) has grown considerably. This pressure has been pushing Japan to adapt its foreign policy. As Roy points out, while many factors have contributed to the hardening of Japan’s stance toward China, the “generational change among the Japanese public as a whole and among Japanese politicians”, in particular, has reduced “the inclination to accommodate China.” He also mentions “the decline of left-wing political influence in Japan”.²⁵⁾

Then there is the objective fact that China is a rising power in the region, economically and diplomatically. Koo explains that China’s rise has meant “that Japan’s

23) Sakuwa, Kentaro (2009) “A Not So Dangerous Dyad: China’s Rise and Sino - Japanese Rivalry”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 45.

24) Rose, Caroline (2000) “Patriotism is Not Taboo: Nationalism in China and Japan and Implications for Sino - Japanese Relations”, *Japan Forum*, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 178.

25) Roy, Denny (2004) “Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan’s Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations”, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 88-89.

bargaining power vis-a-vis China has declined significantly. China may feel less constrained to challenge Japan than any time hitherto".²⁶⁾

Weigand argues that China has been taking full advantage of its new position, making use of tactics such as coercive diplomacy and issue linkage. Whenever a crisis arises, either deliberately or accidentally, China uses threats in the territorial dispute as bargaining chips to achieve some other end, as we have seen above. Describing the mechanism in more detail, she explains that,

in response to Chinese threats in the territorial dispute, Japan can risk use of force and potential occupation of the disputed islands by China, or accede to some or all of China's demands about another disputed issue. Because Japan will presumably defend its sovereign territory at any cost, a threat by China must be taken seriously and must be considered a high priority. Therefore, when China links the territorial dispute to another disputed issue, Japan must seriously consider China's demand for a policy change on the other issue, or risk China following through on the threat. China knows that Japan values the disputed territory, so China expects that Japan will give in to China's strategy and change its policies, especially since China holds a strategic advantage over Japan.²⁷⁾

This means that the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, embedded within the general complexity of the Sino-Japanese relationship, cannot easily be reduced to a matter of territorial sovereignty. It is meshed within a network of other issues, used for transversal, often obscure strategic purposes, and influenced by myriad domestic and international pressures. Given these entanglements, Pan explains that both sides

find great difficulties in coping with this issue. Although the dispute has not led to direct military conflict between the parties involved, neither side can afford to relax its vigilance. The governments have been at pains to downplay the issue, keep the dispute as low-key as possible, and prevent the trouble from deteriorating bilateral relations. But they are at the mercy of domestic and international political factors beyond their immediate control. Occasional incidents instigated by nationalist extremists in both China and Japan remain devastating.²⁸⁾

Sakuwa might agree, noting that

26) Koo, Min Gyo (2009) "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, p. 227.

27) Wiegand, Krista E. (2009) "China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy", *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 176.

28) Pan, Zhongqi (2007) "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective", *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 87.

although it is premature to conclude that those disputes will lead to ‘threat to use force’ or ‘use of force’, the possibility cannot be excluded. Territorial disputes may exacerbate the Sino-Japanese diplomatic tension as theorists predict, and there are some foreboding signs... The possibility that the dispute causes future instability cannot be thoroughly refuted.²⁹⁾

IV. International Political Relations

It is generally acknowledged that the United States has been playing a mediating role, making sure that things do not spiral out of control. The position of the United States towards the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue therefore deserves our attention, for two main reasons. First, the US-Japan Security Treaty plays a major role concerning the fate of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan was signed on the 8th of September 1951. Since then the United States military has been present in and around Japan. This alliance has defined the post war military dynamics of the region; or, as Sakuwa puts it, the

East Asian regional order has largely been maintained by the so-called San Francisco System, or the US-led network of bilateral security arrangements with Pacific allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Among the alliances, the US-Japanese alliance is of particular importance because of its combined military capability, supported by a high level of interoperability.³⁰⁾

But the relationship is strained by several problems, such as the lack of a common interpretation of Pacific War events, and the definition of what specific military attributes Japan is allowed to have. The treaty itself is for many in Japan a constant reminder that they are still paying the price for their past. As such, “some Japanese elites have expressed weariness with their subordinate status in their relationship with the United States”.³¹⁾

Koo believes that it is the existence of this treaty that has contributed to keeping the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict under control. “Through its alliance and commitment to defend Japan, the United States has allowed Japan to avoid direct confrontation with China, thus ensuring that Sino-Japanese disputes take place within certain confines.”³²⁾ Article I of the

29) Sakuwa, Kentaro (2009) “A Not So Dangerous Dyad: China’s Rise and Sino - Japanese Rivalry”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 9, No. 3. p. 519-520.

30) Ibid, p. 501.

31) Roy, Denny (2004) “Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan’s Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations”, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 88.

32) Koo, Min Gyo (2009) “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic

treaty in fact states that US “forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without.”³³⁾

Perhaps it is because of this treaty that the US has tried to keep as far away from taking sides over the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute as possible. Wary of encouraging either party, the United States has tried to maintain the peace essentially by staying neutral. This position of neutrality towards the conflict is crucial for the well being of the already fragile relationship between the United States and China as well. The US, in fact, insists that its “involvement could in no way prejudice any underlying claims and that any conflicting claims are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned”.³⁴⁾

A second reason the US role is important to Sino-Japanese relations is due to the expansion of the United States military in East Asia, also known as the ‘US pivot to Asia’. This maneuver has had a significant impact on the regions’ balance of power. Some argue that the increased United States military presence in, and strategic focus on, Asia, has fortified Japan’s role in the region. In this regard, Sakuwa explains that “it is possible that the United States could intervene in the Sino-Japanese military relationship when the US security interest, specifically stability in the region, may be upset”.³⁵⁾

Not surprisingly, then, has the expansion of the United States’ military presence in the region made many in China anxious, denouncing the pivot as a containment strategy instead. Roy reminds us that the Chinese’s most pressing concern is in fact not Japan, but “dealing with US hegemonism”. Japan’s “immediate strategic salience stems from its involvement in this more compelling challenge: Japan as a pillar of US power in Asia”³⁶⁾

Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 210, quoting Blanchard, J. F. (2000) “The U.S Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands 1945-1971”, *China Quarterly*, Vol. 161, pp. 95-123, Hara, K. (2001) “50 Years from San Francisco: Re-examining the Peace Treaty and Japan’s Territorial Problems”, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 361-82, and Lind, Jennifer (2004) “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy”, *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 92-121.

33) Extract from the Article I of the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan: September 8, 1951

34) Koo, Min Gyo (2009) “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 233, quoting Hara, K. (2001) “50 Years from San Francisco: Re-examining the Peace Treaty and Japan’s Territorial Problems”, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 361-82, and Park, C (1973) “Oil Under Troubled Waters: the Northeast Asia Sea-bed Controversy”, *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 212-260.

35) Sakuwa, Kentaro (2009) “A Not So Dangerous Dyad: China’s Rise and Sino-Japanese Rivalry”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 506.

36) Roy, Denny (2004) “Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan’s Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations”, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 90..

This already precarious picture is further complicated by the presence of Taiwan in the dispute. Taiwan acts as a kind of third party to the dispute, albeit it is considered by China to be little more than a 'rebel province' that will sooner or later be encompassed back into the mainland.³⁷⁾ Taiwan is also claiming ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which they call the Tiaoyutai Islands. The archipelago is located some 180 kilometers northeast of Taiwan and is thus closer to that country than to Japan or Mainland China. The waters have always been important fishing grounds for Taiwanese vessels.

In April 2012 China invited Taiwan to work together to solve the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Taiwan declined, quoting the sovereignty issues that loom over the relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC). As Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Lai Shin-Yuan said, "the ROC and Mainland China will not deal with the [Tiaoyutai Islands] disputes together. Mainland China said the two sides should solve these issues together, but that is not the approach we are taking because [Taiwan and Mainland China] already have sovereignty disputes. We insist on our sovereignty."³⁸⁾

Over the years, Japan has offered many signs of sympathy towards Taiwan. From visa grants to the more recent fishery agreement, reached in April 2013, discussed above. Despite lacking formal diplomatic relations, Japan and Taiwan have cooperated on many levels.

Japan officially subscribes to the one-China Policy in accordance with the 1972 bilateral communiqué, which states that Tokyo "understands and respects" that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." Nevertheless, a large number of Japanese politicians are sympathetic to Taiwan. Among all the peoples of Asia, the Japanese feel a relative closeness to the Taiwanese, based not only on geography (the southwest end of Japan's Ryukyu Island chain is only about fifty miles from the main island of Taiwan) but also on close historical association (Japan occupied and administered Taiwan for fifty years before the end of World War II, and Taiwanese are far less bitter about that experience than Koreans or mainland Chinese).³⁹⁾

The Chinese are rather displeased by this cozy relationship. "Any Japanese support for Taiwan independence," they say, "indicates that the Japanese have not fully repented for the harm they did to China during the Pacific War because they continue to infringe on

37) See Kissinger, Henry (2011) *On China*. London: Penguin.

38) *Radio Taiwan International*, "Taipei Declines Beijing's Invitation To Solve Disputed Territory Issues Together", 26 April 2012, [wire service report].

39) Roy, Denny (2004) "Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan's Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations", *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 99.

Chinese sovereignty in other ways”.⁴⁰⁾ Taiwan can certainly be added to the list of factors that impede Sino-Japanese relations from recovering.

The is also a de facto supporter of Taiwan. Since the was passed in 1979, the United States, which has strong military capabilities in Taiwan, has also sold arms and provided military training to the Taiwanese armed forces. The disputed islands play an important role in the US-Taiwan relation, too, as they “sit right in the middle of the likely sea route between US forces that would be deployed to Taiwan from Okinawa, a factor of which China is aware. Any action taken on the disputed islands therefore indirectly affects US military capabilities and Taiwan”.⁴¹⁾

V. Nationalism in Japan and China

Reviewing the economic and diplomatic aspects of the dispute, we can note that patriotic sentiments have a strong impact on the development of events. The islands have become a strong nationalistic symbol for both nations involved, and are a constant focal point of right wing nationalist extremists from both China and Japan. Media coverage on the issue in China and Japan often reflects these nationalist sentiments. Since this research focuses on the relationship between different aspects of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, it is important for us to understand the connection that social phenomena such as nationalism has with the dispute. This section will look at Chinese and Japanese nationalisms and explain how they affect Sino-Japanese relations in the context of the dispute.

Looking at the history of nationalism in China and Japan, Rose explains that there is a difference between state nationalism and cultural nationalism. She mentions that “although elites in both countries were active in promoting patriotism in the 1980s and 1990s, their efforts had limited impact, whereas cultural nationalism, on the other hand, managed to capture the popular mood.” She defines this “popular” nationalism as “driven by intellectuals, journalists and writers and focusing on debates about history, culture, and national ‘values’”.⁴²⁾ This observation suggests that the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue should be seen as a cultural phenomenon as well as a political one.

In the wake of the cold war, however, as both countries were facing several internal

40) Ibid.

41) Wiegand, Krista E. (2009) “China’s Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy”, *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 190..

42) Rose, Caroline (2000) “Patriotism is Not Taboo: Nationalism in China and Japan and Implications for Sino - Japanese Relations”, *Japan Forum*, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 170.

crises on the political and economic levels, the trend started to change, and cultural nationalism started to transform, or feed into, state nationalism. The emergence of state nationalism can be observed in the contents of the Japanese media around the turn of the century. Articles on state patriotism started to make frequent appearances in conservative magazines and newspapers. The stigma tied to patriotism was lifted and Japan's national identity became a major theme in the mainstream media as well. Nowadays, the conservative press in Japan often uses the lens of patriotism to address all kinds of international issues. Opining on the Senkaku/Diaoyu controversy, a recent article in *Sapio* magazine forecasted that Japan would easily defeat China if the two countries were to go to war over the islands, using its coast guard capabilities alone.⁴³⁾

In Japan, nationalistic sentiments surrounding the dispute have had a strong impact on domestic politics. Nationalist parties are constantly pulling coalition governments further to the right and forcing them to take stronger and stronger stances on the issue. As Chinese academic Pan explains,

the most critical point is that the extreme nationalist groups can make gestures about the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands at any time and may thus cause serious problems for Japan's relations with China... and the dissident groups in the Japanese Diet are able to cause even greater problems over the islands to serve their own ends... Should domestic legitimacy be taken into consideration, no Japanese government could afford to be regarded as "soft" or "weak" on this dispute."⁴⁴⁾

This kind of pressure on domestic politics has become rather significant in recent elections. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's political campaign appearances in a tank and a fighter plane on an island of similar aspect to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands was a clear endeavor to revive nationalistic sentiments. The Japanese government must play the patriotic card carefully, however, because, as Jennifer Lind writes for the *New York Times*, "true, there are atrocity-denying nationalists - but there are also many reasonable conservatives and moderates, as well as liberal activists, scholars, journalists, artists, writers and filmmakers who have devoted their careers to historical truth telling and fighting the whitewashing of wartime horrors in school textbooks."

In China, state nationalism developed a little differently. Young reminds us that "government use of nationalism is hardly unique to China, and in fact is often used by other countries to rally citizens around common causes, especially in wartime," but he

43) http://www.shogakukan.co.jp/magazines/back_number/id_094000, May 11, 2013.

44) Pan, Zhongqi (2007) "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective", *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 86.

also points out that China stopped using nationalism for these purposes for several decades following the Korean war, shutting itself from the world and focusing on domestic campaigns (like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution). It was only around the mid and late 1990s, a prosperous time of growth for China, that the government started exploiting national pride to gather support of various agenda items.⁴⁵⁾

Nationalist sentiment was spread by the media through anti-foreign campaigns, which were usually characterized by portraying “China as a victim”.⁴⁶⁾ This phenomenon was extensively observed during the 2005 anti-Japanese marches. That year, Japan’s bid for a permanent seat at the UN, followed by the approval of a new school textbook that downplayed the role of the Japanese army in WWII, set off a wave of protest that swept across all of China.

Young investigated the role of the Chinese government on the media during these protests, and found many instances of complicity. For example, online petitions against Japan were being signed without any interference from the central government, which amounts to a deliberate approval from Beijing for the protests.⁴⁷⁾ Later, as protests and vandalism towards Japanese shops and embassies started to become more frequent and severe, the sentiment in the media switched from one supportive of the protests to one less sympathetic, warning the public about the punishments that would be applied to protesters. “The media went from fanning the flames of nationalism to suddenly issuing stern warnings to Chinese citizens to stop their activities or risk serious consequences”.⁴⁸⁾

This pattern of behavior can be traced back to the early 1990’s, when, following the ideological heterodoxy of Chinese students that culminated in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, the Chinese leadership sought ways to taper, or at least try to manage, nationalist outbursts in the country. Since then, Chinese authorities have been concerned that nationalist protests could spiral out of control and end up becoming revolts against the state. As such, they have been authorizing protests only when it seems a good time for the government. All protest are controlled in a way that they can be shut down minutes before they degenerate into revolts against the government.

The Chinese authorities have also found that authorizing and managing protests can be used as a technique to divert public attention from other issues. As Wiegand remarks,

the general strategy of the CCP has been to allow anti-Japanese protests, which divert political frustrations to Japan rather than the government, but then call them off soon afterwards in order to prevent them from spiraling into anti-government protests... Thus,

45) Young, Doug (2012) *The Party Line*. London: Wiley, p. 174.

46) Ibid, p. 176.

47) Ibid, p. 177.

48) Ibid, p. 186.

government officials mobilize domestic support only to the point where the government appears to be defending homeland territory, but not enough to provoke the masses into nationalist demonstrations that might threaten the tight control the ruling elite have over the masses.⁴⁹⁾

VI. Anti-Japanese Sentiment

The main theme of the nationalist protests in China is anti-Japanese sentiment. Since this obviously impacts the relationship between the countries, and is often involved in the rhetoric used during the Senkaku/Diaoyu island disputes, the sentiment deserves more attention.

Across much of East Asia, the atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese military during and before World War II have not been forgotten by the victims. There is still deep resentment towards Japan in many countries. Japan's unwillingness to admit responsibility for war crimes committed during the Second Sino-Japanese War, for example, has contributed to keeping anti-Japanese sentiment in China particularly strong. A number of key points of contention keep resurfacing, such as the periodic attempts by Japan to downplay their misdeeds in their history textbooks and visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese officials. These controversies are relevant to our research because they are related to nationalist discourses and, also, have a direct impact on the economic and political issues surrounding the disputed islands.

We were able to observe in the previous section that the Chinese media often plays an incendiary role in the territorial dispute by saturating publications with anti-Japanese messages. Indeed, as Roy explains, in China, "young people as well as old remain unwilling to accept Japan as a 'normal country' (largely because the Chinese government has continually reprised stories of Japanese wartime brutality through the media and education system over the past half century)".⁵⁰⁾

In North East Asia, anti-Japanese sentiment is fueled through different channels, from unabashed state sponsored propaganda to more insinuating cultural dimensions, like video games that portray Japan as the enemy. As a consequence, negative sentiment toward Japan remains strong: in particular the younger generations in China are increasingly reporting strong negative feelings toward Japan.⁵¹⁾

49) Wiegand, Krista E. (2009) "China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy", *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 177.

50) Roy, Denny (2004) "Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan's Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations", *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 86.

51) Gries et al. (2009) "Historical Beliefs and the Perception of Threat in Northeast Asia:

In 2001, and then again in 2005, there was a row between the two countries over the content of Japanese school textbooks. The new versions of the textbooks, approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education, downplayed Japan's crimes in the war. In the 2005 incident, also mentioned in the section above, following the approval of the textbooks China demanded Japan make adjustments that would bring the history textbooks closer to the reality of what happened. Japan refused to make the eight specific changes to the standard junior high school history textbook, giving rise to organized demonstrations throughout China, Hong Kong and South Korea.

Similarly, the Yasukuni Shrine controversy regularly makes the headlines. Repeated visits by high-ranking Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japanese soldiers (including 14 Class A war criminals convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East), have drawn negative attention toward Japan. The continued visits are seen as an unapologetic act, and routinely spark protests in Beijing and in other cities.

Roy explains that the “Chinese believe Japan has not acknowledged adequately its aggression and atrocities against China and other countries during the Pacific War and that the Japanese government remains permissive, if not supportive, of apologists for Japan's behavior during the militarist era”.⁵²⁾ Interestingly, he also points out, however, that “the Chinese government has an interest in exploiting the historical guilt issue to wring additional economic aid out of Tokyo and to undermine Japan's potential growth in military power and regional leadership”.⁵³⁾ Weigand also sees a strategy of issue linkage here, noting that China often uses historical shaming to try achieve gains on other issues.⁵⁴⁾

Some believe that Beijing may be overplaying the history card. In a recent encounter at the G20, Xi Jinping did not attend a planned formal meeting with his Japanese counterpart based on the fact that “China and Japan had different interpretations of the ‘original points’ of their relationship.”⁵⁵⁾ Suganuma believes that this type of anti-Japanese sentiment may represent a threat for the future of Sino-Japanese relations. He notes that “China's growing irredentist tendency... increases the likelihood of territorial conflicts by fueling nationalist sentiments in its neighbors”.⁵⁶⁾

Colonialism, the Tributary System, and China-Japan-Korea Relations in the Twenty-First Century”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 9, p. 259.

52) Roy, Denny (2004) “Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan's Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations”, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 94.

53) Ibid.

54) Wiegand, Krista E. (2009) “China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy”, *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 183.

55) <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1304567/japans-abe-urges-reset-ties-meeting-xi-jinping>, September, 6, 2013.

56) Quoted in Koo, Min Gyo (2009) “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-

In Japan and China today, historical resentment, cultural and state nationalism, and internal domestic politics are all inextricable from the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. But can this lead to a conflict between the two countries? Looking at the correlation between nationalism and conflict, Steven van Evera observes that “nationalism can increase the possibility of international conflict”. A study by Gries et. al. that correlated historical beliefs and perceptions of threat among Chinese and Japanese students showed that participants “agreed substantially that their governments should aggressively defend their national territory. This was especially true among the Chinese students, who appear to have responded to this question as a matter of principle”.⁵⁷⁾ But, as Rose stresses,

patriotic rhetoric is not necessarily translated into an aggressive foreign policy. In China’s case it is more often aimed at creating the illusion of internal unity in the face of a perceived foreign or domestic threat, and in Japan’s case at boosting popular appeal. Of course, such practice is not unique to the Chinese and Japanese governments.⁵⁸⁾

Though an undeniable link exists between nationalism and conflict in North East Asia, it is unlikely that this link is of a causal nature. As Rose puts it, “common trends in the development of Chinese and Japanese nationalisms help to explain why some of the issues in Sino-Japanese relations arose in the first place. But they also help to explain why conflict did not develop, since they were overwhelmingly domestic debates with domestic aims”.⁵⁹⁾

VII. Conclusion

The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is a result of a competition for resources of economic, strategic and social value. Economically, with urbanization growing at an astronomic pace all over the world, but most impressively in Asia, countries like China and Japan are ever more thirsty for energy. As oil prices rise, the geopolitical stakes of the

Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, p. 209.

57) Gries et al. (2009) “Historical Beliefs and the Perception of Threat in Northeast Asia: Colonialism, the Tributary System, and China - Japan - Korea Relations in the Twenty-First Century”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 9, p. 258.

58) Rose, Caroline (2000) “Patriotism is Not Taboo: Nationalism in China and Japan and Implications for Sino - Japanese Relations”, *Japan Forum*, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 170.

59) *Ibid*, p. 179.

Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute will also rise, as it will soon become a case of what Koo describes as resource nationalism.⁶⁰⁾

We have seen that tensions over the islands also negatively affect trade relations between the two countries. Yet we also saw that the existence of these trade relations, and the need to preserve the economic benefits they bring, stops the conflict from ever escalating beyond a certain point. The territorial conflict, in fact, is sometimes even used as a bargaining chip to achieve economic gains, especially by China. This tells us that the priority is keeping/advancing the economic relationship.

The political relationship has been following a similar dynamic, as both countries have been fostering good relations despite a natural inclination that, arguably, points in a different direction. Recurring problems, often tied to differing interpretations of historical events, may seem to momentarily mar the relationship, but they never become an actual cause for conflict. In particular, both countries proved willing to co-operate politically whenever the long term relationship was at risk. This leads us to conclude that the bilateral political relationship is largely at the service of the economic and trade relationship that exists between the countries.

There are, however, some signs that this might be changing. In particular, Japan is becoming increasingly less enthusiastic about keeping good economic and political relations with China, especially as right wing/nationalistic domestic pressures have been mounting in the Japanese political arena. Add to that the fact that China itself has been rising as a regional power, and become more assertive in its own foreign policy, and the situation may in fact change sooner than expected.

Some observers note that what has been keeping the relationship between China and Japan stable is the presence of the United States in the region. The so-called San Francisco System, is a network of bilateral security arrangements between the US and countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that has been inherited from the postwar era. It may be strained by a number of problems, not least China's distaste for anything that may increase US "hegemonism", but when it comes to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute the US has been playing a restraining role.

The US's commitment to defend Japan from a military attack, for example, has served to stave off any serious military action by China, and has ensured that confrontation over the issue has occurred within certain confines. Knowing this, the US has also been trying hard to keep a neutral stance toward the issue, and not encourage either side to take any action outside of those defined confines. The US, in fact, is also interested in keeping good relations with China, and has therefore been somewhat reluctant to give

60) Koo, Min Gyo (2009) "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, p. 209.

Japan too many reassurances over its treaty commitments.

The existence of Taiwan as a third claimant to the islands, however, risks complicating the uncertain balance between the US, China and Japan. Taiwan and Japan enjoy good relations (despite not having formal diplomatic ties), and the US is a material sponsor of the Taiwanese armed forces. China considers Taiwan a “rebel province” and is wary of US involvement there. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands lie directly between Taiwan and the US military base in Okinawa. As such, Taiwan may be listed as a factor that negatively affects a lasting solution to the Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial dispute.

Yet, from this review, it is clear that what has most contributed to keeping the dispute alive are social and cultural factors and the impact they have on the domestic politics of both countries. Reviewing the economic and diplomatic aspects of the dispute, we often noted that patriotic sentiments have a strong impact on the development of events. The islands are a nationalistic symbol for conservatives in both countries.

In Japan, the negative postwar stigma that was tied to patriotism has been lifted in recent decades, as the memory of WWII becomes more and more distant. Right wing factions have, as a consequence, gained a stronger voice both in the media and the politics of the country. In China, as economic growth started to create internal problems, such as high levels of income disparity, the authorities increasingly turned to fomenting nationalist sentiment to keep popular discontent at bay and gather support for various agenda items. In China, nationalist sentiment was thus expressed through anti-foreign campaigns that typically characterized China as a victim of imperialist ambitions.

Many of these campaigns were directed against Japan. It is interesting to note, however, that whenever nationalist protests started to spiral out of control, the Chinese government would intervene and calm the situation down by limiting the tone in the media and even issuing warnings against the protestors. Observers note that the authorities are interested in shutting protests down before they degenerate into revolts against the government in China itself. This pattern can be observed since the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Ever since then, the government is interesting in being able to manage nationalist sentiment to its advantage, without risking it turning against them.

We have also seen that the main theme of the nationalist protests in China is anti-Japanese sentiment. Japan’s unwillingness to admit responsibility for war crimes committed during the Second Sino-Japanese War has contributed to keeping anti-Japanese sentiment in China strong. A number of key themes, therefore, like history book content in Japan and official visits to the Yasukuni shrine, are continually linked back to, and used in support of, the territorial controversy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Using historical indignation in support of the territorial dispute is part of the

general Chinese strategy of issue linkage.

Nevertheless, despite strong nationalistic discourses in both countries, we may note this sentiment has never been translated into an actual aggressive foreign policy, by either government. In Japan's case, patriotism is used essentially for election purposes, while in China anti-Japanese sentiment is used as a mechanism to divert popular attention from other issues or to gain support on this or that policy item. This leads us to conclude that both patriotism in Japan, as anti-Japanese sentiment in China - much like the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute itself - are but organic parts of the general equilibrium that has existed between China and Japan for decades, if not more.

References

- Alkhalili, Omar (2013) "Disputed Territory: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands", *Political Geography Now*.
- BBC Online (2013) "China Media: Territorial Dispute with Japan", October 30.
- Blanchard, J. F. (2000) "The U.S Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands 1945 - 1971", *China Quarterly*, Vol. 161, pp. 95-123.
- Clement, Nicolas (2012) "Economic Cost of China's Anti-Japanese Sentiment", *Fair Observer*, October 25.
- CNN Online (2012) "Chinese Tourists Cancel Trips to Japan Amid Island Spat", September 13.
- Deans, Phil (2000) "Contending Nationalisms and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 120.
- Fravel, Taylor. (2005) "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes." *International Security*, Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 46-83.
- Gries et al. (2009) "Historical Beliefs and the Perception of Threat in Northeast Asia: Colonialism, the Tributary System, and China - Japan - Korea Relations in the Twenty-First Century", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 9.

- Hara, K. (2001) "50 Years from San Francisco: Re-examining the Peace Treaty and Japan's Territorial Problems", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 361 - 82.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain (1998) "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949 - 1992: A First Cut at the Data", *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 153, pp. 1-30.
- Kai, Jin (2013) "China and the US-Japan Alliance in the East China Sea Dispute", *The Diplomat*, December 27.
- Katz, Richard (2013) "Mutual Assured Production", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August issue.
- Kissinger, Henry (2011) *On China*. London: Penguin.
- Koo, Min Gyo (2009) "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 205-232.
- Lind, Jennifer (2004) "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy", *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 92 - 121.
- Lind, Jennifer (2013) "The Limits on Nationalism in Japan", *The New York Times*, July 23.
- Masuda, Masayuki (2003) "Japan's Changing ODA Policy Towards China", *China Perspectives*, Vol. 47.
- Ng, Teddy (2013) "Japan's Abe Urges Reset in Ties in Meeting with Xi Jinping", *South China Morning Post*, September 6.
- Nye, Joseph Jr. (2012) "Japan's Nationalist Turn", *Project Syndicate*, November 9.
- Pan, Zhongqi (2007) "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective", *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 12, No. 1.
- Park, C (1973) "Oil Under Troubled Waters: the Northeast Asia Sea-bed Controversy", *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 212 - 260.

- Rose, Caroline (2000) "Patriotism is Not Taboo: Nationalism in China and Japan and Implications for Sino - Japanese Relations", *Japan Forum*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 169-181.
- Rosenberg, David (2005) "Managing the Resources of the China Seas: China's Bilateral Fisheries Agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam", *Japan Focus*, June 30.
- Roy, Denny (2004) "Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan's Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations", *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 86-101.
- Sakuwa, Kentaro (2009) "A Not So Dangerous Dyad: China's Rise and Sino - Japanese Rivalry", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 9, No. 3.
- Sasajima, Masahiko (1996) "Storm Over Senkakus: How to Deal with a Hot Nonissue," *The Daily Yomiuri*, October 2.
- Strecker-Downs, Erica and Saunders, Philip (1999) "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 114-146.
- Wiegand, Krista E. (2011). *Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy and Settlement*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Wiegand, Krista E. (2009) "China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy", *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 170-193.
- Young, Doug (2012) *The Party Line*. London: Wiley.

【 논문초록 】

키워드 (Key words)	영토 분쟁, 중국, 일본, 민족주의, 반일 감정 Territorial Disputes, China, Japan, Nationalism, Anti-Japanese Sentiment
<p style="text-align: center;">A Review of the Social, Cultural, Political and Economic Dimensions of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Eduardo Zachary Albrecht · Betty Chemier</p> <p>This research will analyze the Senkaku/Diaoyu situation by looking at the relationship between the economic, political, social and cultural aspects of the dispute. The methodology used will be a review of various American, Japanese, Chinese and Korean authors that have written on the dispute. This literature review will allow us a more accurate assessment of the economic, political, social and cultural phenomena that influence the territorial dispute. Finally, this paper will contribute to the literature on the dispute through a discussion on the relationship that exists between the different dimensions, and particularly how each dimension influences the other.</p> <p>Economically, the expected reward is the oil and gas that is believed to be in the disputed area. However, we also find that as tensions over the islands rise, trade relations between the two countries are negatively affected. The need to preserve the economic benefits of trade stops the conflict from ever escalating beyond a certain point. The political relationship has been following a similar dynamic. Despite the use of acrimonious rhetoric, both countries proved willing to co-operate politically whenever the long term relationship was at risk. This leads us to conclude that the bilateral political relationship is largely at the service of the economic and trade relationship that exists between the countries.</p> <p>Yet, from this review, it is clear that what has most contributed to keeping the dispute alive are social and cultural factors and the impact they have on the domestic politics of both countries. Reviewing the economic and diplomatic aspects of the dispute, we often noted that patriotic sentiments have a strong impact on the development of events. The islands are a nationalistic symbol for conservatives in both countries, where politicians often use this symbol for their own domestic political advantages.</p>	
필자 인적사항	성명(한글): 에두아르도 제커리 알브레흐트 · 베티 차미에 (영문): Eduardo Zachary Albrecht · Betty Chemier 국문제목: 센카쿠 / 다오 위다오 섬 분쟁의 사회적, 문화적, 정치적, 경제적 차원의 검토 영문제목: A Review of the Social, Cultural, Political and Economic Dimensions of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute 소속: 부경대학교 국제지역학부 E-mail: edu_albrecht@yahoo.co.uk · bettychemier@gmail.com
논문작성 일시	투고일 : 2014. 2. 9. 심사일 : 2014. 2. 24. 심사완료일 : 2014. 3. 5.