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◀ 논문 요약 ▶

이 연구는 주요 4개국(중국, 러시아, 미국, EU)의 한반도에 대한 최근 다양한 전략들의 경향을 심층 이해하기 위함이다. 또한 이러한 전략의 동향을 추론하고 가까운 미래에 무엇을 기대할 수 있는지에 대한 더 나은 아이디어를 얻는 데에 도움을 줄 수 있다. 이 연구는 국제적 행위자들 사이의 외교적, 전략적인 합의점이 없다면 안정은 불가능하다는 것을 보여주기 때문에, 당사국들 간의 신뢰의 정도에 초점을 맞추고 있다.

연구에 사용된 방법론은 어떠한 환경에서 상호간의 관계가 개선되는지 혹은 악화되는지 조사하기 위해서 2006년부터 2012년까지의 기간 동안에 각 국가들이 관련 된 전략적, 지정학적 상황의 질적 조사를 포함한다. 또한, 위 연구는 UN 상임이사국에서 전개된 일들과 분단된 한국의 안보 문제와 무기 확산 이슈와 관련된 상임이사국의 결의안에 초점이 맞추어져 있다. 이에 다음의 결과가 도출되었다.

상임이사국의 결의안은 더 발전한 지역 플레이어들의 장기적인 전략적 이해관계, 상대적인 안정의 기간 그리고 그에 따르는 신뢰 등에 대응하는 것이었다. 특히, (1) 중국이 지역 내에서 주요 이해당사자로서의 그들의 역할을 발전시키거나 혹은 (2)미국이 일본과 대한민국에 주둔하고 있는 미군에 대해 정당성을 주장하는 것을 허용하는 등의 협정은 꽤 흥미롭게도 국가들 간의 상호 신뢰도를 높이는 역할을 할 수 있을 것이다. 그러므로 (1), (2)와 같은 협정들이 서로에게 모순되는 것이 아닌 도움이 된다는 것을 알 수 있다.

주제어: 외교정책, 동북아시아, 미국, 유럽, 중국, 러시아, 북한, 유럽연합, UN안전이사회

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I. Introduction

This study will look at the strategic relationships between China, Russia, the US and the EU as they relate to the Korean Peninsula, and at the rising and falling levels of trust between them. It is necessary, therefore, to start by defining more precisely what is meant by the term trust. This is a vague concept, as there are multiple ways of conceiving it. Nevertheless, if we are to accurately measure the level of trust between the different international actors in relation to the Korean Peninsula then we must find a way of defining it. In the field of International Relations, the existence of trust among two or more actors indicates "a willingness to take risks on the behavior of others based on the belief that potential trustees will 'do what is right.'"¹⁾

This implies that trust is based on the sharing of common beliefs and common definitions of right and wrong. But how do we measure the sharing of common beliefs? Trust, on the one hand, may allow states to calculate risk and take important strategic positions that have very real effects; yet, on the other, it is also a very intangible quality that is particularly difficult to measure in absolute terms.

Like the concept of right and wrong itself, trust is a shifty and often self-serving moral construct that is constantly being bargained over. For example, is it right for sovereign states to be trusted with developing their own nuclear programs? Should smaller states delegate the task of providing nuclear security to the international nonproliferation regime? The answer to these questions depends on whether or not we believe that those that manage such a regime will do so in our best interest - that is, that they have the same notion that we have about what is right and what is wrong. In fact, scholars agree that "trust refers to an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one's interests under the control of others."²⁾ This can only happen if all involved agree on a common definition of "what is right".

The presence or absence of trust among actors in international relations is, therefore, not easy to pinpoint. Nevertheless, this study would like to put forth that trust is manifested

1) Aaron M. Hoffman, "A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, No.3 (2002): 375 - 401, p. 375.

2) *Ibid.*, pp. 376 - 377.

in the behavior that each actor displays in relation to the other. Trust, or the absence thereof, is expressed in a state's conduct, and this, fortunately, can be more easily gauged. In this study we should like to put forth that by analyzing the strategic actions taken by each of the players we may be able to measure the rising and falling levels of trust amongst these in relation to the Korean Peninsula.

As such, the methodology will focus on events that unfolded in the UN Security Council and in the Korean Peninsula in the time frame from 2006 to 2012. Through a qualitative examination of the strategic and geopolitical context in which each actor was embedded, we may be able to identify what circumstances contributed to building trust and which did not. The study's methodology focuses on events that unfolded in the arena of the UN Security Council, and, in particular, on events that relate to the security problem of a divided Korea and the issue of weapons proliferation, since all four players considered here are represented in the Security Council and have an interest in containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the region.³⁾

Four case episodes have been selected. These cases are (1) Resolution 1695 adopted on July 15, 2006, condemning a DPRK missile-launch test; (2) Resolution 1718 adopted on October 14, 2006, condemning a DPRK underground nuclear test; (3) Resolution 1874 adopted on June 12, 2009, imposing further economic sanctions in the aftermath of another underground nuclear test; and (4) the April 13, 2012, Security Council condemnation of a new rocket launch in Chulsan-gun. The fourth, albeit not involving a Security Council resolution, has been included due to the fact that it was the first major event involving the new leadership in Pyongyang. Each of these episodes will be the launching pad for an analysis into the strategies of one or more of the players listed above: China, Russia, the US or the EU.

The analysis of each case episode has been conducted from two different perspectives. First, we examine the narrative surrounding the actions taken by the Security Council. Second, we discuss the strategic interests of the UNSC permanent members. This review

3) While the EU is not represented in the Security Council, two of its most prominent members, France and the UK, are. They both have permanent seats and often attempt to harmonize their own policies with the EU's. Their combined policies obviously do not add up to the EU's comprehensive policies, but there have been moves toward increased harmonization, especially since the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. This issue will be examined in more depth below.

method has been set up so that the first step grants us the necessary insight to proceed to the next. The first part, in which we look at the narrative surrounding the facts, tells us what strategic interests for what actor were mostly at play. The second part, in turn, gives us a better understanding and contextualization of events as they unfolded.

This review method allows us to isolate and determine what specific “characteristics” of each case episode had what specific effect on the level of trust. What actions by which players were effective in building trust, and what actions were not? What strategic interests contributed to building trust, and what interests did not?

II. Resolution 1695 (July 2006): Chinese and Russian Strategies

On July 5, 2006, the DPRK conducted a series of seven missile firings. The launches themselves were not illegal and did not break any international treaty, but they did shake up the region quite a bit. Japan immediately proposed a resolution calling for action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—which opens the way for the possible use of force against an international threat.⁴⁾ China quickly opposed Japan’s proposal saying that such a measure would just deepen tensions in Northeast Asia, and it sent a diplomatic mission to Pyongyang instead. As that mission produced little by way of tangible results, negotiations intensified in the Security Council, with the US backing Japan on the need to table a strong resolution, and Russia backing China on the need to drop any references to Chapter VII.⁵⁾

By July 15th, the US and Japan agreed to drop the explicit reference to Chapter VII, replacing it with a paragraph saying that the Security Council is “acting under its special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”⁶⁾ This, according to

4) Chapter VII does not authorize the use of force per se, although the Security Council often says it is “acting under Chapter VII” when it wants to emphasize that a resolution contains binding measures. These measures may or may not include the authorization of “action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” as stated in Article 42 of the charter. For more information on Chapter VII, see Security Council Report, “Security Council Action Under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities,” Special Research Report No. 1, New York, June 2008.

5) Warren Hoge, “U.N. Council, in Weakened Resolution, Demands End to North Korean Missile Program,” New York Times, July 16, 2006, available at Bloomberg, July 16, 2006, available at www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/world/asia/.

6) UN Security Council Resolution 1695 (July 15, 2006), UN Doc. S/RES/1695.

the then US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, made the resolution just as binding as it would have been with an explicit reference.⁷⁾

The resolution was the strongest reprimand the Security Council had adopted against the DPRK since the Korean War. It required all UN member states to take measures to combat missile proliferation by preventing the transfer of "missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology" to the DPRK. In addition, it required that all states cease the transfer of "financial resources in relation to DPRK's missile or WMD programs."⁸⁾ For some observers, the resolution itself held great symbolic importance because it demonstrated that the five permanent members of the Security Council were willing to compromise and find common ground, despite their differences.⁹⁾

Nevertheless, consensus among most at the time was that the resolution was considerably weakened by the compromise, having to rely on softer wording that, for example, "strongly urge[d]" the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks. Observers noted that the divisions within the Security Council had contributed to making the resolution, ultimately, toothless. In fact, Pak Gil Yon, the DPRK's ambassador to the UN at the time, rejected it as soon as it was adopted, and made it very clear that his government had no intention of taking any of it seriously. According to the North Korean official state news agency, KCNA, it was the result of a "hostile foreign policy towards the DPRK," which created "an extremely dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula." It went on, clarifying that

"only the strong can defend justice in the world today where the jungle law prevails. Neither the UN nor anyone else can protect us... First, our Republic vehemently denounces and roundly refutes the UNSC "resolution", a product of the US hostile policy towards the DPRK, and will not be bound to it in the least. Second, our Republic will bolster its war deterrent for self-defense in every way by all means and methods now that the situation has reached the worst phase due to the extremely hostile act of the US. We will firmly defend our own way the ideology and system chosen by our people, true to the Songun

7) Bill Varner, "UN Council Demands North Korea End Missile Program," Bloomberg, July 16, 2006, available at www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZwjGrrME5GA.

8) UN Security Council Resolution 1695.

9) Karin Lee and Julia Choi, "North Korea: Unilateral and Multilateral Economic Sanctions and U.S. Department of Treasury Actions 1955 - April 2009," Washington, DC: The National Committee on North Korea, April 2009, p. 32.

policy, a treasured sword.”¹⁰⁾

By the time Resolution 1695 was passed in the summer of 2006, the strategic positions of the different countries comprising the permanent members of the Security Council with regard to the DPRK were already clear. More than a decade of experience with the DPRK’s nuclear brinkmanship had made the geopolitical contours of the region rather obvious. One thing that did stand out this time around, however, was the depth of the strategic partnership that had been created between China and Russia. The crux of the discussion leading up to the adoption of this resolution pivoted around the divergent positions of the US on the one side, and China and Russia on the other.

On the surface, China and Russia simply disagreed with the US over the strength of the wording and the inclusion of references to Chapter VII. However, underneath the surface, the Chinese and Russian positions in the Security Council were converging over a common need to resist US unipolarity, to establish buffer boundaries, and to avoid any unnecessary disturbances to their increasingly restless populations internally.¹¹⁾

David Kerr explains that they both have an interest in the multipolarization of power in Northeast Asia, as elsewhere, and have often collaborated over the Korean crisis in order to prevent the US from applying any unilateral solution.¹²⁾ It is possible that this common interest has solidified Sino-Russian relations. These, while not always rosy, are rarely a source of any serious tension. In a survey of Chinese public opinion, respondents were asked to name the countries that posed a threat to China. Only 3 percent identified Russia as a threat (76 percent identified the US).¹³⁾

Geopolitical balancing is a major consideration in both China and Russia’s foreign policies. The DPRK, which shares a long border with China and a shorter one with Russia, figures prominently in both countries’ strategic thinking. In Chinese history books, the

10) Korean Central News Agency, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Refutes Resolution of UN Security Council,” Press Release, July 16, 2006, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1695. “Songun” refers to the military-first policy.

11) These three needs are sometimes dramatically intertwined.

12) David Kerr, “The Sino-Russian Partnership and U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: From Hegemony to Concert in Northeast Asia,” *International Studies Quarterly* 49, No.3 (September 2005): 411 - 438.

13) Wenfang Tang, “Political and Social Trends in the Post-Deng Urban China” *The China Quarterly* 168 (December 2001): 890-909.

Korean War was a victory for the People's Liberation Army. Indeed, the Chinese succeeded in reaching their wartime objective: pushing the US-UN forces out of the North and to the acceptable boundary of the 38th parallel.¹⁴⁾ The need to defend this past success is behind many of China's decisions in the Security Council concerning the DPRK. China's insistence on not including any reference to Chapter VII in Resolution 1695 - that would raise the specter of the use of force in and against the DPRK - can be explained in this way. Russia is just as sensitive when it comes to its border nations. The South Ossetia War of August 2008 sent a clear signal in this sense.¹⁵⁾

Lastly, both the Chinese and Russian states are facing potentially destabilizing internal problems. Rapid economic change and overstretched government apparatuses have contributed to inequality and have strained relations with minority populations. These issues are all factored in to their foreign policies. In particular, China and Russia share the perceived need to avoid at all costs foreign manipulation of these internal cleavages. (They feel that any "growing pains" must be resolved independently for their nation to be strengthened and for it to emerge as an autonomous and respected player on the global stage.) A collapsed DPRK would almost certainly increase the flow of refugees into China, with potentially destabilizing effects in the Chinese Northeast, where there already exists a sizable Korean minority. Russia, managing myriad ethnic minorities on its own territory, is in a position to sympathize with the Chinese.

In sum, the convergence of Chinese and Russian interests in Northeast Asia created a strong, unified front within the Security Council in New York that ultimately slashed the credibility of the resolution. In fact, three months later, the Security Council found itself dealing with yet another DPRK provocation, this time of the nuclear sort.

III. Resolution 1718(October 2006): China's Strategy

On October 3, 2006, the DPRK announced its intentions to test a nuclear device. On October 9 the device was detonated, and the KCNA released the following statement:

14) Kerr, "The Sino-Russian Partnership."

15) See Ronald D. Asmus, *The Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

"The nuclear test was conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology 100 percent. It marks an historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the KPA [Korean People's Army] and people that have wished to have powerful self-reliant defense capability. It will contribute to defending the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the area around it."¹⁶⁾

Immediately, talk of additional sanctions intensified. Asked about the possibility of a new resolution filed against his country, the DPRK envoy to the UN said that "it would be better for the Security Council to offer its congratulations rather than pass 'useless' resolutions."¹⁷⁾ Five days later the resolution was passed anyway, imposing, among other things, an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to the nuclear program, and limitations on the export of weapons and luxury items to the DPRK.¹⁸⁾

Not surprisingly, the DPRK rejected the resolution, calling it "gangster-like of the Security Council to have adopted today a coercive resolution while neglecting the nuclear threat and moves for sanctions and pressure of the United States against the DPRK," specifying how "this clearly testifies that the Security Council has completely lost its impartiality and still persists in applying double standards in its work."¹⁹⁾

Despite the usual lack of sync between the Security Council and the DPRK mission to the UN, this round of sanctions saw a somewhat less confrontational atmosphere within the Security Council itself. Reference was made to Chapter VII without much commotion, although military enforcement was barred. It is particularly interesting to note that, some days after the resolution was adopted, the tone of the Sino-US dialogue was actually rather positive. Some senior US State Department officials, including then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, went as far as saying that, in the end, the nuclear crises may even bring the US and China into a closer partnership.²⁰⁾

16) Korean Central News Agency, "DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test," Press Release, October 10, 2006.

17) "US Asks for Tough UN Sanctions on North Korea," VoiceofAmerica, October 9, 2006.

18) United Nations Department of Public Information, "Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006)," Press Release No. SC/8853, October 14, 2006.

19) "Security Council Imposes Sanctions on DPR Korea After its Claimed Nuclear Test," UNNewsCentre, October 14, 2006, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp.

20) Thom Shankar, "A Different Tactic for Rice: Speaking Softly Without the Stick," TheNewYork

In fact, the general post-resolution environment was far less tense this time than it was after the July 16th resolution. Just six days after the Resolution 1718 was adopted, Kim Jong-il allegedly said that he was "sorry" about the test and was looking to make some concessions, including returning to the six party talks.²¹⁾ In fact, at a low-key meeting with envoys from the US and China on October 31, the DPRK quietly agreed to rejoin the talks.²²⁾ The talks resumed on December 18, 2006.

Marcus Noland noted that, "before the test, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications in Asia, possibly even prefiguring war," but none of that happened. Indeed, Noland points out, even stock markets in Asia were unmoved by the event.²³⁾ Oddly, there was no significant disruption to international alliances or to the foreign strategies of the great powers in the region.

The sanctions themselves were just as inconsequential. The new ban on luxury items was largely ignored—luxury trade to the DPRK actually increased between 2006 and 2007.²⁴⁾ The DPRK's arms trade was also unaffected, according to Clara Portela, "partly due to the fact that Pyongyang sells arms and missiles to 'countries of concern' such as Iran, Pakistan, Yemen and Syria, which are unable to find alternative suppliers easily,"²⁵⁾ and are, arguably, not always the most enthusiastic about imposing UN sanctions in the first place.

Ironically, when the KCNA stated that its country's nuclear capabilities would "contribute to defending the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the area around it,"²⁶⁾ it was not completely off the mark. The events leading up to Resolution 1718, and those immediately following it, saw a remarkable lining up of interests among

Times, October 23, 2006, available at www.nytimes.com/2006/10/23/world/asia/23rice.html.

- 21) "Report: Kim 'Sorry' About N. Korea Nuclear Test," NBC News, October 20, 2006, available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15341349
- 22) "North Korea to Rejoin 6-Nation Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, October 31, 2006, available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15494100
- 23) Marcus Noland, "The Non-Impact of UN Sanctions in North Korea," *Asia Policy* No. 7 (2009): 61 - 88, pp. 63 - 64.
- 24) *Ibid.*, p. 74.
- 25) Clara Portela, "Impact of Sanctions and Isolation Measures with North Korea, Burma/Myanmar, Iran and Zimbabwe as Case Studies," paper prepared for the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, European Parliament, 2011, p. 14.
- 26) Korean Central News Agency, "DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test," Press Release, October 10, 2006.

many of the concerned parties.

The Chinese and the Americans, forced to cooperate on the issue, found some common ground-shaky, but common. The DPRK's behavior, after the deed, seemed to indicate that it had reached some sort of strategic objective of its own with the nuclear test, and was now willing to talk. Perhaps it felt that, as a confirmed nuclear power, its standing among nations was now more solid.

Whatever the case, the events of October 2006 inaugurated a long period of increased trust between the DPRK and the international community, exemplified by the resumption of the six party talks. Why was this so? Why were the key players in the region behaving as if the new state of affairs was a win-win situation? The reasons can be found in (a) the changing nature of China's relationship with the DPRK and (b) the changing nature of China's relationship with the international community.

The Sino-DPRK relationship has always been somewhat ambiguous. In the years leading up to Resolution 1718 Beijing had maintained a military alliance with Pyongyang, had been contributing generous economic and military support, and was increasingly involved in different types of joint economic ventures. Nevertheless, by the fall of 2006, the two countries' strategic goals were becoming less and less compatible and the relationship was coming under considerable strain.

China was becoming less willing to put up with the DPRK's erratic behavior, not least because of the stirring effects this was having in South Korea, the US, and Japan. A nuclear DPRK is arguably more of a headache for China than any other major power in the region. The more weapons it has, the more pressure there is on South Korea and Japan to fabricate their own nuclear capacity. Japan has already accumulated tons of plutonium and is thought to be able to produce a bomb within a very short time. For Ting Wei, "possession of nuclear arms by these regional powers that are democratic and remain loyal allies of the US is regarded as detrimental to Chinese interests."²⁷⁾

Yet, intervening politically in the DPRK to change the leadership's behavior was not possible. For China, any political change in the DPRK must be delayed until it can be

27) Ting Wei, "China's Strategic Thinking: The Role of the European Union," in *Europe-Asia Relations: Building Multilateralisms*, edited by Richard Balme and Brian Bridges (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p.146.

properly managed. More precisely, it is imperative for China to avoid any post-collapse scenarios that involve the possibility of having US troops on its border. Therefore, China had no choice but to play along with Pyongyang's antics. The leadership in the DPRK knew this all too well, and continued with whatever strategy it deemed best—testing the limits of China's patience first with the July 5 missile firings and then with the October 9 nuclear test.

But there was also an upside for China in all of this. Chinese strategists saw that there was an opportunity to be had from the situation. If they could not get the DPRK to behave, then perhaps they could at least benefit from its troublesome behavior. They knew that the more dangerous the DPRK, the more the international community would look to them to broker a solution, bolstering the image of China as a "responsible stakeholder." China long perceived itself as a kind of middle man between the isolated DPRK and the West. The events of October 2006 provided a perfect opportunity to cement that image.

This "right of brokerage" gave China more real power, too, since it was tantamount to acknowledging that the DPRK is indeed under its sphere of influence. It could be argued that China had been strategizing for years and positioning itself exactly for this. The US and the EU, which had been only intermittently warming up to this idea, embraced it a little more wholeheartedly in the aftermath of the 2006 nuclear test. For this reason, the events can be considered a strategic win for the Chinese—contributing to a period of relative calm in the region.

What happened is that the regional players found new footing. There was a kind of settling into new positions—much like the earth's crust after a seismic shock—that allowed for a change in attitude and for trust to be built in the international community, and, by extension, in the Security Council.

IV. Resolution 1874(June 2009): the EU's Strategy

On April 5, 2009, the DPRK launched a long-range ballistic missile over Japan. This led to a Security Council condemnation by way of a presidential statement, in response to which the DPRK said it would abandon the six party talks, restart its nuclear facilities, expel international and US inspectors, and conduct another nuclear test. On May 25th the

DPRK detonated an underground nuclear device. Japan said the test was “unacceptable” and a violation of the UN Security Council resolutions.²⁸⁾ China chimed in: “The DPRK ignored universal opposition of the international community and once more conducted the nuclear test. The Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it.”²⁹⁾ Unperturbed, three days later the DPRK threatened to end the Korean War armistice and claimed that the Korean Peninsula could go back to a state of war. On June 12th the Security Council passed Resolution 1874, which

“condemned in the strongest terms the 25 May nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and tightened sanctions against it by blocking funding for nuclear, missile and proliferation activities through targeted sanctions on additional goods, persons and entities, widening the ban on arms imports-exports, and calling on Member States to inspect and destroy all banned cargo to and from that country - on the high seas, at seaports and airports - if they have reasonable grounds to suspect a violation.”³⁰⁾

An interesting development in this round of sanctions was the increased participation of European nations, both in the Security Council negotiations and in the immediate aftermath of the resolution’s adoption. The permanent representative of France to the United Nations, for example, announced the satisfaction of his country in having adopted a resolution that only targets the government, and not the people, of the DPRK:

“The sanctions that we passed are strong, they send a very clear signal that the international community is not ready to accept what the North Korean authorities are trying to do. We are imposing sanctions only against the people, entities and goods which are related to nuclear activities. We are trying to preserve the future of the population of North Korea, which is already suffering a lot through the regime, which is in a very serious humanitarian situation.”

He continued, emphasizing that,

“at the same time, we are calling on the authorities of North Korea to join back the

28) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Press Statement V4+ Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.” Press Release, May 25, 2006.

29) “Chinese Government ‘Resolutely Opposes’ DPRK’s Nuclear Test,” Xinhua, May 25, 2009.

30) United Nations Department of Public Information, “Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions.” Press Release No. SC/9679, June 12, 2009.

six-party talks. We think it is very important for them to rejoin the dialogue with the rests of the international community. It is never too late to be in a position to enjoy peaceful and secure relationship with your neighbors.”³¹⁾

North Korean people. The Russian representative also highlighted this issue. He added, however, that the sanctions should be lifted as soon as possible once the DPRK cooperates.³²⁾ Despite the stronger wording, the more willing collaboration of China and Russia, the increased participation of European nations, and the detailed instructions on what goods to ban, the new, thirty-four-article resolution still explicitly excluded the use of coercive measures to enforce sanctions.³³⁾

It was also unclear what effect the sanctions could have, given that the DPRK ships significant amounts of cargo on its own vessels and would likely refuse inspection.³⁴⁾ The DPRK’s official response to the resolution left little room for doubt regarding its intention of noncompliance. The resolution was followed by a series of “countermeasures” by the DPRK in the next months, including a declaration to develop a new uranium-enrichment program in order to further “weaponize” its stockpile.³⁵⁾ According to its side of the story,

“The US and Japan, not content with this ‘resolution’, are hatching dirty plots to add their own ‘sanctions’ to the existing ones against the DPRK by framing up the fictional issues of ‘counterfeit money’ and ‘drug trafficking’. The US incited the United Nations Security Council to get more deeply embroiled in its attempt to stifle the DPRK, which resulted in the creation of an unprecedentedly acute tension on the Korean Peninsula. Had any other country found itself in the situation of the DPRK, it would have clearly realized that the DPRK has never chosen but was compelled to go nuclear in the face of the US hostile policy and its nuclear threats. It has become an absolutely impossible option for

31) “North Korea: Adoption of Resolution 1874—Remarks to the Press by Mr. Jean-Maurice Ripert, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations,” France at the United Nations website, June 12, 2009, available at www.franceonu.org

32) United Nations Department of Public Information, “Security Council, Acting Unanimously.”

33) The Security Council referred to taking Article 41 (non-coercive) measures and not Article 42 (coercive) measures.

34) Neil Mac Farquhar, “UN Security Council Pushes North Korea by Passing Sanctions,” New York Times, June 12, 2009, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/world/asia/13nations.html

35) Peter Crail, “UN Tightens North Korea Sanctions,” Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, July/August 2009, available at www.armscontrol.org/print/3730

the DPRK to even think about giving up its nuclear weapons. It makes no difference to the DPRK whether its nuclear status is recognized or not.”³⁶⁾

The increased participation of European nations in this round of negotiations was not by chance. The Lisbon Treaty was coming together at around the same time, and one of its provisions was the delineation of a Europe-wide foreign policy. In past Security Council negotiations, the UK and France had been relatively less vocal when it came to the DPRK. One reason for this was the considerable divergence among the two countries concerning not only what to do with the DPRK but also the degree to which they should harmonize their foreign policies with that of the US. Brian Bridges finds that, as the different DPRK nuclear crises unfolded, some Europeans (mainly of the continental sort) began to be concerned with the US's attitude:

“It should be noted that while the Europeans have been critical of the North's posturing, they have also demonstrated some frustration at the US approach, in particular its reluctance to talk with the North Koreans, and, in the light of revelations about intelligence errors on Iraq, they also became more skeptical about US revelations of North Korean efforts to cheat on the 'Agreed Framework' by secretly developing highly enriched uranium.”³⁷⁾

Nevertheless, by the summer of 2009 France and the UK were feeling the need to synchronize their national positions with those of a fitful, but slowly emerging, EU foreign policy. This meant, among other things, taking a stronger position on the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. The reference to humanitarian conditions in the DPRK was also not by chance. The then nascent European External Action Service was seeking to integrate normative standpoints, such as issues of human rights, into its foreign policies as instruments befitting what some have termed a post modern superpower.³⁸⁾

The term “postmodern superpower” roughly refers to an increased reliance on soft power

36) Korean Central News Agency, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures Against UNSC's 'Resolution' 1874,” Press Release, June 13, 2009.

37) Brian Bridges, “The European Union and the Korean Conundrum,” in *Europe-Asia Relations: Building Multilateralisms*, edited by Richard Balme and Brian Bridges (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p.218.

38) Ulrike Guérot, “Europe Could Become the First Post-Modern Superpower,” Washington, DC: The European Institute, Fall 2004, available at www.europeaninstitute.org/20040902261/Fall-2004/europe-could-become-the-first-post-modern-superpower.html

(i.e., the creation of common values and a common civic culture) in lieu of traditional means of projecting influence in foreign relations. For example, in relation to the DPRK, the EU has not only been concerned with security issues, it has consistently been tabling resolutions concerning humanitarian issues in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. With the UK presidency of the EU in 2005, the EU also sponsored a resolution on DPRK human rights at the UN General Assembly.

This in spite of (or partly because of) the fact that the DPRK and the UK have established diplomatic relations since December 2000. In fact, human rights have been a constant theme throughout the relationship - the UK provides "human rights training" for DPRK officials, and its embassy in Pyongyang co-finances a number of "humanitarian projects."³⁹ We may see this as part of the way that a self-styled "postmodern state" projects power.

Many European nations have been undergoing this process of change in their foreign policies. This predilection for the postmodern and for soft power has led to a perception of continuity in which misbehavior in one field (human rights) is linked to misbehavior in another (missile and nuclear proliferation), so that Europeans have tended to view reprimands in the one field (whistle-blowing on human rights abuses) as applying the necessary political pressure that will eventually bring benefits in the other (containment of missile and nuclear proliferation).⁴⁰

This logic goes both ways, so that sanctions against missile and nuclear proliferation can be seen as part of a general strategy that may eventually improve human rights conditions as well. Such reasoning was partly the premise for which European nations in the Security Council decided to more enthusiastically back Resolution 1874.

V. Security Council Condemnation (April 2012): the US's Strategy

In February 2012, the DPRK agreed to a partial freeze in nuclear activities and a

39) Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Travel and Living Abroad," available at www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/asia-oceania/north-korea

40) See Eduardo Z. Albrecht, "North Korea in the East Asian Puzzle: Anthropological Perspectives for EU Policy Developments," Brussels: European Institute for Asian Studies, April 2012.

missile test moratorium in return for US food aid. Since early 2009, the United States had provided virtually no aid. Relations between the DPRK and the international community were beginning to thaw, as analysts in the west looked upon the new leadership in Pyongyang with a mixture of anxious expectancy and goodwill. That is, until on April 13 the DPRK put an earth observation satellite called Kwangmyongsong-3 (“brightstar 3”) on to an expendable carrier rocket called Unha-3 (“galaxy 3”) and hurled it into the sky. The launch, purportedly for weather forecasting purposes, was a failure. The rocket disintegrated a minute or so after launch and fell into the sea west of Seoul. Nevertheless, the international media portrayed it as a veiled ballistic missile test, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead into any number of foreign cities.

In an unusual move, the DPRK acknowledged the failure and insisted that the launch was for peaceful purposes. The satellite was meant to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jung-un’s grandfather and the founder of the state.⁴¹⁾ For Japan, however, there was no room for misunderstanding. The Japanese chief cabinet secretary said “the flying object which North Korea referred to as a satellite was a missile,” and that his country would therefore seek another Security Council resolution against the DPRK.⁴²⁾

With China and Russia urging the usual “restraint,” and with the US and others realizing early on that another resolution would not have been possible, the Security Council agreed that the launch was in violation of Resolutions 1718 and 1874 and needed to be condemned.⁴³⁾ On April 16 the Security Council condemned the launch and demanded that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches.⁴⁴⁾ No new resolution was passed:

41) “UN ‘Deplores’ North Korea Botched Rocket Launch,” BBC News Asia, April 13, 2012, available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17703212

42) “Japan to Seek UN Security Council Resolution Against North Korea Over Missile Launch,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 13, 2012.

43) “UN Security Council to Meet on North Korea,” Financial Review, April 13, 2012, available at <http://afr.com/p/home>

44) United Nations Department of Public Information, “Security Council Condemns Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Satellite Launch as Breach of Resolutions Barring Country’s Use of Ballistic Missile Technology,” Press Release No. SC/10610, April 16, 2012.

however, existing sanctions were tightened. Adjustments were made to the measures imposed by Resolution 1874 in 2009, which in turn included adjustments made to the measures imposed by Resolution 1718 in 2006.

While all Security Council members agreed relatively swiftly on the condemnation, the spotlight was brought onto the new leadership in Pyongyang. Questions were raised about the new government's strategy and, in particular, how the international community should relate to it. Ruan Zongze of the China Institute of International Studies said that the West should not "overreact" to the launch, explaining that any exaggerated response would only push the DPRK further into a corner, and ultimately increase the militarization of the region.⁴⁵⁾

Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations saw things differently, advising that, for the moment, the West should not let its guard down. For him the failed launch constituted a humiliating setback for the new leader, who would now have to resort to some other provocative act to reconsolidate his authority. "If history is any guide, this suggests that a test of a nuclear warhead or some sort of aggressive military action... could be in the offing."⁴⁶⁾ One unnamed US official said that the launch failure could speed up the new leadership's determination to conduct a third nuclear test, citing satellite photographs that allegedly showed those preparations underway.

In the US, Mitt Romney, then the presumptive Republican nominee, used the rocket launch for political reasons. He said that the "emboldened" attitude of the DPRK was a sign that Obama's strategy of "appeasement" had failed, and that the DPRK was now in a position to undermine the security of the US.⁴⁷⁾ Anxiety levels rocketed in the media and among the political establishment in Washington, pushing the US Congress to cancel the proposed food aid deal mentioned above and the administration to cease the momentary rapprochement that had begun.

Then on February 12, 2013, after more rounds of disapproval and finger waving from the

45) "Press Split After North Korean Rocket Launch," BBC News Asia, April 14, 2012, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12672889>

46) Richard Haass, "North Korea's Failure: The Good and the Bad," New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 13, 2012.

47) Cited in Sang-hun Choe and Rick Gladstone, "North Korean Rocket Fails Moments after Liftoff," The New York Times, April 12, 2012, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/world/asia/

West, the DPRK went ahead and conducted its third underground nuclear test. Less than a month later, on March 7, UN Security Council Resolution 2094 was adopted.

While the rocket launch itself was not particularly noteworthy (and largely intended for internal propaganda reasons, celebrating and consolidating the Kim's latest dynastic succession), the level of alarm and uncertainty that spread through Western nations, in particular the US, was noteworthy. Why did the launch create such a panic? The simple answer is that the US genuinely sees Pyongyang's continued weapons-ban noncompliance as a material threat to itself.

However, many observers have noted that this point alone is insufficient to explain the US's strategic interests in the region - and, by extension, the US foreign policy establishment's reaction to the rocket launch. In particular, they note that the US also needs to maintain and improve its military alliance system with South Korea and Japan. Tied to this, the US needs to find ways to add momentum to its "pivot to Asia" strategy - which welcomes a shift in American foreign policy away from the Middle East to focus on East and South Asia. It can be observed that the last two of these strategic interests (strengthening the alliances with Japan and South Korea, pivoting to Asia) are in direct contradiction with the first (neutralizing the DPRK threat).

To understand the existence of this contradiction, it is necessary to quickly review the recent history of US-DPRK relations. With the end of the Cold War - and the end of Soviet subsidies - the DPRK resorted to a strategy of using nuclear proliferation as the principal means to secure the material resources needed for its own survival. By the turn of the century they had successfully set up a threat-engagement cycle that essentially bargained the creation and cessation of threats for US guarantees of sovereignty on their part of the peninsula. This explains why threats have always "been left deliberately ambiguous" and the "capacities to act on these implicit and explicit threats" has always been "very opaque and uncertain."⁴⁸⁾

This nuclear strategy could not have come at a worse time for the US. Indeed, it is conceivable that the timing was not by chance. In the post - Cold War 1990s and 2000s, many nations were reconsidering their affiliation to the global nonproliferation regime

48) Peter Hayes, "The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony," Japan Focus, October 4, 2006, available at www.japanfocus.org/~Peter-Hayes/2238

spearheaded by the US. Some, including allies of the US, felt uneasy with the US's unchallenged "leadership" in nuclear matters, and were feeling unsure about the US's capacity to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to smaller, relatively unstable countries and groups. The DPRK's announced intention to leave the nonproliferation treaty in 1993, and its effective abandonment in 2003, signaled a weakness in that system.⁴⁹⁾ In The US has had to try to make the best of this situation. The option of regime change through armed intervention would put an end to the nuclear challenge, but it would also set off a series of ripple effects whose costs are simply too high to manage. Notably, the US's relationships with China and South Korea would have to be seriously renegotiated. Since full military intervention to neutralize the threat was off the table, the US (just like China, see part 3) opted for the second-best solution, utilizing that very threat to its strategic advantage.

For David Kerr, the nuclear threat "serves to validate the US focus on material factors" in the region.⁵⁰⁾ The lack of a stable security system in Northeast Asia keeps the spotlight on the need to maintain and strengthen the US-Japan and the US-South Korea military alliances, and to deepen the working relations with other, emerging powers in the region, including China.⁵¹⁾ In this way, the nuclear crises can serve to legitimize US an increased US presence in the region.

Such a dynamic has created the incentive for the US to continuously characterize the DPRK as a threat, but yet not too much of a threat. Peter Howard finds that the US has been, in fact, engaged in an ongoing effort to discursively portray the DPRK as both dangerous (i.e., an inhumane state with weapons of mass destruction), but also manageable (i.e., run by an irrational and buffoonish leadership). It is important for the US to keep the threat "manageable," for an all-out war, as considered above, is not the preferred option.

"By examining the US entanglement in intersected language games... it becomes possible to show how the United States could construct North Korea's nuclear program as a manageable threat that could be dealt with diplomatically." This ambivalence, he says, has

49) Ibid.

50) Kerr, "The Sino-Russian Partnership," p. 433.

51) For the US stance on China, see Hillary Rodham Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Washington DC: US Department of State Foreign Policy Magazine, October 11, 2011.

made it possible for the US to continually seek negotiated solutions, despite the fact that the DPRK represents a larger material threat to the United States and its security interests than, for example, Iraq or Afghanistan ever did.⁵²⁾

This may in part explain the US's reaction to the April 13 rocket launch, where the DPRK was again portrayed as a maximum security threat, but no serious case was made for military intervention, even after the nuclear test that followed. The DPRK must be threatening enough to justify a continued US military presence in the region, but not so threatening as to actually require preventive strikes or regime change.

This, in turn, explains why despite the acrimonious political tones and the nuclear test that followed, levels of trust between the regional players continued to rise all throughout 2013 and the situation on the peninsula has remained stable.

Roland Bleiker, in an article published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, argues that this dynamic has been obscured by "the highly technical discourse of security analysis" that "has managed to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea's actions, even if the situation is in reality far more complex and interactive."⁵³⁾

VI. Conclusion

The DPRK has successfully been provoking the international community with weapons proliferation for decades. The Security Council's current approach of matching these provocations with ever expanding sanctions has not stopped nor reversed the trend. Actually, the more the DPRK has been chastised and isolated, the more it has sought to exploit and enjoy that gray area in the international legal system it has cut out for itself.

"Indeed, the DPRK has declared that it doesn't seek prestige or external recognition of its nuclear weapons status and stands outside all legal frameworks governing nuclear weapons. In effect, it has attributed to itself a self-declared nuclear outlaw status. In

52) Peter Howard, "Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, No. 4 (December 2004): 805 - 828, p. 805.

53) Roland Bleiker, "A Rogue Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," *International Affairs* 79, No. 4 (2003): 719 - 737, p.719.

response to the call by 189 countries at the 2010 NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] conference that the DPRK denuclearize and return to the NPT, it rejected any notion that it is beholden to the international community or its rules for governing nuclear weapons.”⁵⁴⁾

Who is in condition to do something about this situation? We have seen that Russia has limited itself to using events to oppose US unilateralism, largely through supporting China in the Security Council. We have also seen that the involvement of the EU tends to be somewhat limited due to an emphasis on “soft-power” imposed by the “postmodern” character of its nascent foreign policy. It would seem like China and the US are arguably the only players in a position to intervene decisively. But why have they chosen not to?

Given the costs of intervention, both have decided to opt for second-best solutions. They have chosen to contain, and not to eliminate, the threat. For China, having a misbehaving neighbor in its “sphere of influence” boosts its role as the go-to discipliner. In addition, they have found that the other players are not entirely opposed to this, contributing to their image as a responsible stakeholder. For the US, intervention would remove the prime justification for its military presence and compromise its pivot to Asia strategy.

Both powers seek to benefit in whatever way they can while avoiding the effort required to put an end to Pyongyang’s antics. Interestingly, maintaining the status quo requires the creation of common interests, common definitions of what is right and wrong, and, ultimately a measure of trust between the players. What conclusion can we draw from this review? It would seem that there are some conditions that contribute to building trust amongst the regional players despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, whenever important strategic interests are met, we can expect a period of relative calm to ensue.

54) Peter Hayes and Scott Bruce, “North Korean Nuclear Nationalism and the Threat of Nuclear War in Korea,” *Pacific Focus* 26, No. 1 (April 2011): 65.

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《Abstract》

A Review of the Chinese, Russian, US and EU Strategies in the Korean Peninsula from 2006-2012

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This study attempts to better understand the recent history of the different strategies adopted by four key regional and world players - China, Russia, the US and the EU - toward the Korean Peninsula. It also uses this analysis to infer trends in these strategies, so that we may get a better idea of what to expect in the near future. Since research shows that in the absence of some form of diplomatic and strategic common ground between international actors stability is not likely to be achieved, the research pays particular attention to levels of "trust" between the different parties.¹⁾

The methodology used involves a qualitative examination of the strategic and geopolitical context in which each actor was embedded in from 2006 to 2012, in order to identify what circumstances contributed to better relations and what circumstances did not. In addition, the study's methodology focuses on events that unfolded in the arena of the UN Security Council (since all four players considered here are represented there) and on UN Security Council resolutions that relate to the security problem of a divided Korea and the issue of weapons proliferation. The study comes to the following conclusion.

Every time a Security Council resolutions responded to the long-term strategic interests of the larger regional players, periods of relative calm and trust ensued. In particular, any arrangement that (a) allowed China to further its role as a major stakeholder in the region or (b) allowed the US to advance the case for its continued military presence in Japan and South Korea would, quite interestingly, increase the level of mutual trust between the different players. We find therefore that arrangements (a) and (b) are not necessarily in contradiction to each other.

Key Words: Foreign Policy, North East Asia, US, EU, China, Russia, North Korea, UN,
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